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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), the Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this appeal from the Order and Final Judgment ("Final 
Judgment") entered by the trial court on September 18, 2008 and the Order 
Awarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs to Defendant Daniel Klibanoff ("Attorneys' 
Fees Order") entered by the trial court on March 27, 2007. (R. 3133-35; 3223-26.) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3. Those entitled to lien - What may be attached. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5. Priority - Over other encumbrances. 
Utah Lmh Ann. § IK I I M I). Attorneys' Fees.1 
S1ATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Homestead Lodge Project 
1. In 2000, Red Sea began efforts to design the Project, a private gated 
luxury condominium development on the Property (R. 2891.) 
2. To purchase the Property and water shares required for the Project, Red 
Sea obtained a $1.3 million loan from Zions First National Bank, which was secured by 
the Trust Deed. The Trust Deed was recorded in the Wasatch County Recorder's Office 
on June 15, 2001 and later assigned to Klibanoff. (Id.) 
1
 These provisions are set forth verbatim in Addendum A. 
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3. The Property, which is approximately 13 acres, consists of four separate 
parcels referred to as the Jones parcel, the Gygi parcel, the Homestead parcel and the 
Guymon parcel. Red Sea purchased the Jones parcel in October 2000, the Gygi parcel 
in January 2001, and the Homestead and the Guymon parcels in June 2001. (Id.) 
Permits and Approvals for the Project 
4. The Midway City Planning Commission granted Vicinity (Concept) Plan 
Approval on February 13, 2001. The Midway City Council granted Preliminary Plat 
Approval for the Project on August 23, 2001. (R. 2890.) 
5. Red Sea obtained a permit from the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers on 
September 19, 2001. The Midway City Council granted Final Plat Approval for the 
Project on September 20, 2001. Red Sea and Midway City entered into the 
Development Agreement on October 1, 2001 and the Preconstruction Meeting was held 
on October 2, 2001 (Id.) 
6. After obtaining Final Plat Approval, Red Sea was unable to secure 
construction financing to begin construction of the Project. Red Sea never obtained a 
construction bond and building permits were never issued for the buildings, roads and 
other improvements for the Project. Consequently, none of the buildings, roads, 
landscaping or other improvements designed by EDS A for the Project have ever been 
constructed. (Id.) 
Oral Contract Between Red Sea and EDSA 
7. In the Fall of 2000, Red Sea entered into an oral agreement with EDSA. 
The terms oral agreement were that EDSA would provide services through all five 
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phases of construction of the Project. Red Sea and EDSA agreed that such services 
would be compensated on an hourly basis and paid monthly as the work progressed. (R. 
2889-93.) 
8. Red Sea and EDSA contemplated that the entire Project would take 
approximately two years or more depending on the approval process. Although EDSA 
had a standard written agreement that it used for projects of this magnitude, EDSA did 
not memorialize any part of its oral agreement with Red Sea in writing. (Id.) 
JJVL Williams Written Conti icts 
9. J.M. Williams and Associates, Inc. ("J.M. Williams") is a structural 
engineer and architectural firm. On February 16, 2001, J.M. Williams entered into a 
contract with Red Sea to perform structural engineering services for the Homestead 
Lodge. ("February Contract"). It provides that J.M. Williams will perform the 
following services: "structural engineering construction documents (w/ mech. and 
electrical design build), no construction administration 1-10 plex unit, and 1 club 
house." As consideration for these services, Red Sea agreed to pay J.M. Williams an 
estimated lump sum fee of $104,640.00. (R. 2888-89.) 
10. A cover letter accompanied the February Contract, which reiterates that 
the lump sum fee does not include "site visits and any construction administration" and 
that "site visits are not included in our fee." Mr. Williams testified that if Red Sea had 
wanted J.M. Williams to provide construction administration services, a new contract 
would have been required. (Id.) 
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1L On October 26, 2001, J.M. Williams and Red Sea entered into a second 
agreement relating to the Project ("October Contract"). The parties agreed that a pre-cast 
concrete could be used instead of "cast-in-place." (Id.) 
12. The February Contract and the October Contract (collectively "Contracts") 
are "integrated agreements" which "supersede all prior negotiations, representations 
and/or agreements, written or oral" and they could not be assigned without the express 
written consent of Red Sea. (Id) 
Visible Commencement of Work 
Surveying, Wetlands Delineation, Soil Testing, And Water Monitoring 
13. On December 6, 2000, Matt Betts of Pentacore delineated the wetlands on 
the Gygi and Jones parcels. Pentacore drilled 11 sampling holes on the Gygi parcel and 
three sampling holes on the Jones parcel with a hand-held auger. After examining the 
samples, Betts backfilled the holes and marked their locations with "pin flags" - 18-inch 
wires with an orange 3-inch by 3-inch flag affixed to the top. (R. 2887.) 
14. Pentacore also placed 51 pin flags along the wetlands delineation line on 
the Gygi parcel and approximately 33 pin flags along the wetlands delineation line on 
the west side of the Jones parcel When imbedded in the ground, the pin flags stood 
above ground by approximately 15 to 16 inches. (Id.) 
15. Rich Chiniquy ("Chiniquy"), the project manager for Red Sea who lived 
on the Property, marked the 51 pin flags on the Gygi parcel with rebar stakes that stood 
above ground by approximately 12 to 15 inches. There were no flags on the rebar. Of 
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the 33 pin flags on the Jones parcel, only 6 to 8 would have been visible from 200 
North. (Id.) 
16. On December 7 and 8, 2000, John Stahl of Cornerstone, Inc. 
("Cornerstone") visited the Property to perform a topographical survey of the Jones and 
Gygi parcels. In connection with the topographical survey, Cornerstone placed 
approximately 14 stakes with flags on the corners of the Jones and Gygi parcels. He 
established 4 to 5 "control points." Two of the control points were located on the Gygi 
parcel. One control point was located on the Jones parcel. The other control points were 
not located on the Property. (R. 2886.) 
17. On January 10, 2001, Earthtec Testing & Engineering, P.C. ("Earthtec") 
drilled eight sampling holes on the Gygi and Jones parcels in order to conduct a 
geotechnical study of the soil and subsurface conditions of the Property, which in turn 
was required to determine engineering loads and to design moisture drainage systems. 
The holes were drilled with a D-120 AT drilling rig which was brought onto the 
Property for that one day by a subcontractor. The holes were backfilled and not marked. 
(Id) 
18. On or about March 6, 2001, Betts and Chiniquy used a hand-held auger to 
drill 8 to 12 eight-inch wide "well" holes to monitor the ground water on the Gygi 
parcel. PVC pipes were placed in the holes which were backfilled, leaving the pipe to 
stick up approximately 12 inches above the ground. The wells were marked with lathe 
stakes with orange ties at the top. (Id.) 
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19. Groundwater measurements in the "monitoring wells" were taken 
manually by sticking a tape measure into the pipes to the level of the water. These pipes 
were not intended to be permanent ground water monitors and were replaced with 
permanent monitoring wells sometime after June 15, 200L {Id.) 
20. On April 16, 2001, Stahl visited the Property to perform a boundary 
survey of the Property. In connection with the survey, Cornerstone placed one additional 
stake with a flag on the comer of the Guymon parcel. (R. 2885.) 
21. On one or two days in April 2001, Betts visited the Property to conduct a 
wetlands delineation on the Guymon parcel. Betts placed eight pin flags delineating the 
wetland area in the southeast comer of the Guymon parcel and used a hand-held auger 
to drill three sampling holes which Betts backfilled and marked with pin flags before 
leaving the Property. {Id.) 
22. The stakes, pin flags and lathes were placed on the Property over a 4 Vi 
month period. Once placed, the pin flags were frequently knocked over or eaten by the 
animals. Therefore, not all of the markings were visible on any given date. The PVC 
pipes were also subject to being knocked over by the animals. {Id.) 
23. The Real Estate Purchase Contracts ("Purchase Contracts") for the 
Property provided for surveys and other tests to be done by Red Sea during the due 
diligence period and prior to the closing on the Property. The Purchase Contracts further 
provided that if Red Sea was not satisfied with the results of the surveys and tests, Red 
Sea would not be required to close on the Property. Red Sea's obligation to purchase the 
Property was also subject to Midway City's granting approval for the Project. {Id.) 
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24. The wetlands delineations, temporary groundwater monitoring, and 
geotechnical testing were all in the nature of soil testing. The wetlands delineations 
involved the testing of soils to determine the presence of wetlands. The geotechnical 
testing involved the testing of soils to determine the bearing capacities of the soil and 
how big the footings and foundations had to be for the buildings. The ground water 
monitoring involved the testing of the water levels in the soils to determine the possible 
depth of excavation for the buildings. {Id.) 
25. The surveys, wetlands delineations, ground water monitoring and 
geotechnical testing had to be performed before EDS A could complete the design of the 
Project. A boundary survey, topographical survey and wetlands delineation were needed 
so that EDS A could determine where to locate the buildings on the Property. (R. 2884.) 
26. The surveys, wetlands delineation, ground water monitoring and 
geotechnical testing were prerequisites to obtaining preliminary and final approvals for 
the Project from Midway City and the required permit from the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers. These permits were required in advance of commencing construction. (Id.) 
Work On The Existing Irrigation Ditch On The Property And Weir 
27. There is an existing irrigation ditch that runs north to south along 
Homestead Drive, which abuts the west side of the Gygi parcel. There is a concrete 
"diversion structure" in the irrigation ditch in the northwest corner of the Gygi parcel. 
The diversion structure has metal gates that can be pushed down to direct the flow of the 
water either to the south in the irrigation ditch running along Homestead Drive or to the 
east along the north boundary of the Gygi parcel. (Id.) 
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28. Running east from the diversion structure is an old underground pipe 
located along the north boundary of the Gygi parcel. The old pipe carried irrigation 
water, when diverted through the diversion structure, east for approximately 40 feet. The 
old pipe was buried with only the east end of the pipe exposed. Water would flow 
through the old pipe into a roughly dug out irrigation ditch that ran eastward along the 
north boundary of the Gygi parcel. (Id.) 
29. To provide water for their livestock which grazed on the Gygi parcel, the 
neighbors diverted the water in the irrigation ditch on the north boundary of the Gygi 
parcel, forcing it to flow southeast over the parcel instead of continuing east in the 
irrigation ditch to the wetlands. (R. 2883.) 
30. Over time, the diversion structure and irrigation pipe filled with dirt, silt, 
and debris. The concrete box in the diversion structure deteriorated and the irrigation 
pipe cracked. As a result, water flowed over the structure and across the Gygi parcel 
rather than through the irrigation pipe and ditch. (Id.) 
31. This flow of water over and across the Gygi parcel created an "artificial 
wetland" on the parcel. Red Sea wanted to dry out this artificial wetland to obtain a 
more favorable wetlands delineation. (Id.) 
32. In October 2000, Chiniquy used a shovel to remove two "check dams" in 
the irrigation ditch on the north boundary of the Gygi parcel. The check dams - which 
were made from debris manually moved into the ditch - diverted water from the ditch 
southeast across the Gygi parcel. This allowed neighbors to water their livestock grazing 
on the Gygi parcel. (Id.) 
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33. On April 16, 2001, Chiniquy replaced the old clogged and leaking pipe 
with a new plastic 15-inch pipe approximately 40 feet in length. The total cost of this 
pipe was approximately $307. He rented a backhoe, removed the old pipe, replaced it 
with new pipe, then reburied the pipe and returned the backhoe in the morning. This 
work was completed in one day. After the new pipe was reburied, only the east end of 
the pipe was visible. (Id,) 
34. The new pipe was not intended to be incorporated into the final 
construction or systems of the Project, but was necessary to dry out the Gygi parcel and 
prevent the development of artificial wetlands. Indeed, EDSA failed to submit any 
plans or drawings showing that the pipe was to be incorporated into the final 
construction of the Project. (R. 2882.) 
35. Sometime in June 2001, Chiniquy spent two hours installing a flat metal 
weir on the Guymon parcel using a shovel. The weir was a temporary device used to 
monitor the flow of water onto a neighbor's property. Once installed, the weir was 
almost completely buried in the ditch and would be difficult to see. The weir would not 
have been incorporated into the Project. (Id,) 
Livestock and Photographs and Appraisals 
36. Livestock, including three or four horses and six or seven sheep, were on 
the property prior to June 15, 2001. Livestock remained on the property through the 
spring of 2001. (Id) 
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37. On April 28, 2001, a Land Appraisal Report for the Property was prepared 
by Chiniquy, which included color photographs of the Property ("Chiniquy Appraisal"). 
(Id.) It identifies the Property as "vacant land." 
38. The color photographs included in the Chiniquy Appraisal are fair and 
accurate depictions of the Property in March and April 2001. These photographs do not 
show any visible signs of the commencement of work or the presence of any building 
materials on the property. (R. 2881.) 
39. On September 17, 2001, Christopher T. Donaldson of Brown, Chudleigh, 
Schuler, Donaldson and Associates prepared an appraisal of the Property for Zions Bank 
("Donaldson Appraisal"), which included color photographs of the Property taken in 
mid-August, 2001. Donaldson took additional color photographs of the Property at the 
same time. (Id,) 
40. The color photographs included with the Donaldson Appraisal as well as 
the additional color photographs taken by Donaldson at that time are fair and accurate 
depictions of the Property during the period of August through September 20, 2001. 
These photographs do not show any visible signs of the commencement of work or the 
presence of any building materials. (Id.) 
Other Facts Regarding Visible Commencement of Work 
41. Orange netting and silt fencing were not placed on the Property until 
October 2001. The corners of the buildings and roads were not staked until October 
2001. (Id) 
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42. Prior to June 15, 2001, there had been no excavation (except that done to 
replace the irrigation pipe), buildings and roads had not been staked, roads had not been 
cut, footings and foundations had not been poured, and there were no construction 
materials that had been delivered to or stored on the Property or any other materials that 
were intended to be incorporated into the Project on the Property prior to June 15, 2001. 
(Id) 
Final Completion of Contracts 
43. By September 20, 2001, EDS A had completed the first three phases of its 
contract, including all site engineering, all architectural and engineering work, the final 
working drawings, and the renderings for the Project. (R. 2880.) 
44. J.M. Williams completed its services as required by the February Contract 
prior to September 10, 2001. At that time, J.M. Williams invoiced Red Sea $119,842.45 
pursuant an invoice dated September 10, 2001. (Id.) 
45. J.M. Williams completed its services as required by the October Contract 
prior to November 13, 2001. At that time, J.M. Williams invoiced Red Sea $1,000.00 
pursuant to an invoice dated November 13, 2001. Thereafter, the only amounts J.M. 
Williams invoiced Red Sea for work of any kind was for $250.00 for a pressure 
reducing box pursuant to an invoice dated October 10, 2001 and for $367. 68 for 
printing costs for extra sets of plans pursuant to an invoice dated March 29, 2002. (Id.) 
46. Red Sea accepted these services without complaint. (Id.) 
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The Mechanic's Lien 
47. On September 26, 2002, Zions Bank recorded a Notice of Default of the 
Trust Deed. On November 8, 2002, EDSA recorded the Mechanic's Lien in the 
Wasatch County Recorder's Office. The Mechanic's Lien states that EDSA "furnished 
the last labor, materials and/or equipment on June 3, 2002." The Mechanic's Lien 
identifies EDSA as the Claimant and provides EDSA's address and telephone number. 
(R. 2878-79.) 
48. The Mechanic's Lien does not include any of the required information for 
the services performed by J.M. Williams on the Project. Specifically, the Mechanic's 
Lien does not include the date when the first and last labor or service were performed by 
J.M. Williams, the name, current address, and current phone number of J.M. Williams, 
or the signature of a representative of J.M. Williams. {Id.) 
Purported Assignment of J.M. Williams Contracts 
49. On January 6, 2003, J.M. Williams purported to assign the Contracts to 
EDSA pursuant to a letter. J.M. Williams did not obtain the written consent of Red Sea 
to assign the Contracts. The January 6, 2003 letter of assignment is not signed by a 
representative of Red Sea. {Id.) 
50. In attempting to assign the Contracts to EDSA together with any 
mechanic's lien rights associated with those Contracts, J.M. Williams intended for 
EDSA to collect money from Red Sea, to pay EDSA/Cloward's attorneys' fees, and to 
then pay the balance of anything collected to J.M. Williams. EDSA received no benefit 
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from the purported assignment and J.M. Williams did not receive any consideration for 
its purported assignment. (Id.) 
51. J.M. Williams - which had not been paid upon completion of its contracts 
with Red Sea - did not itself record a mechanic's lien for any outstanding amounts owed 
by Red Sea. (Id.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court's ruling that there was no visible commencement of work or 
furnishing of materials on the Property prior to June 15, 2001 was not clearly erroneous. 
The trial court correctly ruled that J.M. Williams' purported assignment of the Contracts 
to EDS A was not effective and, in any event, the Mechanic's Lien, as it related to J.M. 
Williams' interests, was not timely or enforceable. Finally, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in its award of attorneys' fees and costs to Klibanoff. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT VISIBLE COMMENCEMENT 
OF WORK FOR PURPOSES OF $ 38-1-5 DID NOT BEGIN PRIOR TO 
JUNE 15, 2001 IS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
At the beginning of trial, the trial court conducted a site visit to the Property 
to better understand the location, visibility and visual impact, or lack thereof, of the 
activities on the Property before receiving testimony and evidence regarding the 
issue of whether there was "visible commencement of work" prior to the recording 
of the Trust Deed. (R. 3177 at 4-16.) After considering the evidence and assessing 
the credibility of witnesses, the trial court determined that the Trust Deed had 
priority over the Mechanic's Lien because there was no "visible commencement of 
work" or furnishing of materials on the Property prior to June 15, 2001. (R. 2875.) 
A. EDS A Fails to Adequately Marshal the Evidence. 
As this Court held in EDSA/ClowardL.L.C v. Klibanoff, "whether the work 
and materials provided adequate notice depends on if a reasonable person would 
know by looking at the land that lienable work is underway" and questions of 
reasonableness are questions of fact. 2005 UT App 367, J 21, 122 P.3d 646. Thus, 
to challenge the trial court's finding of no visible commencement of work, EDS A 
must marshal the evidence by first listing "every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports" this finding. See AWINC Corp. v Simonsen, 
2005 UT App. 168, TI9, 112 P.3d 1228, 1230; West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. 
Co,, 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). EDSA must then show that such 
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evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding when viewing the evidence 
and inferences in a light most favorable to the decision. See A WINC at \ 9. 
Moreover, "[presenting evidence supporting the challenged conclusion does not 
satisfy the marshalling requirement. Parties cannot discharge their duty by 'simply 
providing] an exhaustive review of all evidence presented at trial.'" United Park 
City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f^ 24, 140 
P.3d 1200, 1206. Rather, "parties are required to 'temporarily remove [their] own 
prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position'; [they] must play the 
'devil's advocate.' In doing so, appellants must present the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the trial court and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light 
favorable to their case." United Park at \ 26. Failing to properly marshal is 
sufficient ground for affirming the trial court's finding. Wayment v. Howard, 2006 
UT 56, f 9, 144 P.3d 1147, 1149-50. 
EDSA has not met its marshalling burden. While identifying some of the 
evidence supporting the trial court's finding, EDSA fails to list every "scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial." For example, when purporting to marshal 
the evidence in support of the trial court's finding that work on the irrigation ditch 
was merely "ordinary maintenance of an existing irrigation system," EDSA does 
not mention that it "failed to submit any plans or drawings showing that the pipe 
[installed in the irrigation ditch] was to be incorporated into the final construction 
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of the Project."2 (R. 2882.) Similarly, EDSA fails to mention that orange 
construction netting was not placed on the Property until October 200l.3 (R. 
2881.) Although it mentions one project status report prepared by Red Sea in April 
2001, EDSA does not refer to the other Red Sea status reports or minutes from 
Midway City meetings during the relevant time period that also confirm that no 
construction had begun on the Project as of June 15, 2001. (R. 3177 at 156-65.) 
Because EDSA has failed to marshal the evidence, this Court must affirm the trial 
court's decision. See Wayment, supra, at \ 9. 
B. Visible Commencement of Work and the Reasonable Observer, 
Mechanic's liens "relate back to, and take effect as of the time of the 
commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or 
improvement, and have priority over any lien, mortgage, or other encumbrance 
which may have attached subsequently to the time when the building, 
improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished 
on the ground." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (2005). The policy of notice requires 
the commencement of work to be visible and on the site itself. Ketchum v. 
2
 In Klibanoff, this Court accepted as true EDSA's assertion that the pipe "was a 
planned and necessary part of the overall improvement and development [and that] it 
created the plans for the irrigation improvements along with the plans for the rest of the 
development;5 2005 UT App 367, U 26. 
3
 Similarly, this Court accepted as true EDSA's assertion that the orange fencing 
was "everywhere" and "would indicate that somebody is dofing] some work on the 
property." Id at^28. 
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Heritage Mountain Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Utah App. 1989). Whether 
work or materials provide adequate notice is determined based on an objective 
standard: whether "a reasonable person would know by looking at the land that 
lienable work is underway." KlibanoffdX \2\. Finally, a reasonable observer must 
take notice that construction has commenced only when a reasonably diligent 
inspection reveals work that is clearly part of a building or improvement. See 
Mark's Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Republic Mtg. Co., Inc., 414 S.W.2d 106, 108 (Ark. 
1967) (stating that visible commencement of construction must be work that is 
"readily visible/' making it "obvious" that improvements were being commenced 
or were underway). 
C The Surveying, Staking and Soil Testing Activities that Occurred on 
the Property Did Not Constitute Visible Commencement of Work. 
In evaluating EDSA's claims in Klibanoff, this Court did not enunciate a 
new standard for determining whether there is visible commencement of work on 
the Property, but rather relied on established Utah case law. Specifically, the court 
recognized Ketchum and its progeny which hold that "' surveying, staking and soil 
testing do not constitute a visible on-site improvement as required by Utah law for 
relation back under §§38-1-5 and -10."" KlibanoffdX \ 29 (quoting Ketchum, 784 
P.2d at 1228). This Court, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to EDS A, 
held that irrigation improvements and orange fencing on the Property, when 
considered together with surveying, staking, and soil testing, may constitute visible 
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commencement of work under the Statute. Id. (emphasis added). In other words, 
there must be a "plus" - something in addition to the preparatory work that would 
put a reasonable observer on notice that lienable work was underway.4 
The evidence at trial demonstrated that there were no such "pluses" in this 
case.5 Every single "fact" relied on by this Court to reverse the grant of summary 
judgment was disproved at trial. There was no installation of a "new" irrigation 
system. There was no installation of a permanent ground water monitoring system 
prior to June 15, 2001. The drilling rig was on the Property for one day in January 
2001 to drill for soil samples, not "for days at a time." There was no orange 
netting on the Property and the corners of the buildings were not staked until 
October 2001. Because the only activities that occurred on the Property prior to 
June 15, 2001 were surveying, temporary groundwater monitoring, and 
geotechnical testing, the trial court properly found that these activities did not of 
constitute visible commencement of work under the Statute or Ketchum. 
The cases make it apparent that although the visibility of a marking left on the 
property is one step in evaluating whether there is visible commencement of work, see 
Klibanoff, 2005 UT App 367 at ^ 20, courts largely focus on the nature of the activity 
represented by the marking, i.e., does the visible marking provide sufficient notice that 
work has actually commenced on the property for purposes of § 38-1-5. 
5
 As the trial court appropriately observed, "the evidence of visible work presented 
at trial by [EDSA] was markedly less extensive and less persuasive" than allegations 
made to this Court in the first appeal. (R. 2874.) 
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D. Preparatory Activities Are Not Enough to Satisfy the Visible 
Commencement of Work Standard. 
Despite Ketchum, EDSA argues that "work preparatory to construction can 
be sufficient to satisfy the Visible commencement of work standard/" (EDSA 
Brief at 19.) Courts, however, have consistently emphasized that preparatory 
activities are not enough. See E. W. Allen & Assoc, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. 
Corp., 776 F.Supp. 1504, 1509 (D. Utah 1991). Instead, the visible work must 
demonstrate a commitment to undertaking a project through to completion. Id. at 
1510. In other words, the character of the work itself must be such that a 
reasonable observer can see it and understand that construction of the project is 
beginning, not just that a project is being planned, considered, or prepared for. 
One of the most frequently cited cases regarding the visible commencement of 
work makes this clear: 
The commencement of the building or improvement 
within the meaning of mechanic's liens statutes is the 
visible commencement of actual operations on the 
ground for the erection of the building, the doing of some 
work or labor on the ground, such as beginning to 
excavate for the foundation or the basement or cellar, 
walling the cellar, or work of a like description, which 
everyone can readily see and recognize as the 
commencement of a building . . . . 
Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Gepada, Inc., 401 F.Supp. 682, 685 (S.D. Iowa 
1975). This standard supports one of the policies behind the visible 
commencement doctrine, which is to ensure that lenders are able to predictably 
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determine whether their trust deed has priority or not. See Ketchum, 784 P.2d at 
1224 (stating that if off-site work constituted commencement of construction, 
predictability would be lost and construction financing would suffer). Given this 
policy, it is understandable why preparatory work is not considered 
commencement of construction. In most circumstances, preparatory work such as 
that done in this case is necessary both to determine whether a project will proceed 
and to arrange financing. Such work is often done as part of the due diligence 
when purchasing property. Developers must gather information regarding the 
suitability of a site and the costs of building before they decide to build. 
Engineers, such as EDSA, must have this information before they can design the 
project. Cities must have this information to review and approve the project. 
Developers must also furnish this information to lenders in determining the amount 
of financing required. In many cases, the project does not proceed based on the 
information gathered. Consequently, courts have made clear that just because 
work is the proper subject of a lien does not mean the work gives notice of 
commencement. See id at 1227. 
A survey of the cases reveals those types of activities which qualify as 
visible commencement of construction and those which do not. See id (holding 
that preparing the soil, leveling the ground, placing survey stakes, and taking soil 
samples do not constitute the requisite visible, on-site improvements); Portage 
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Realty Corp. v. Baas, 298 N.W.2d 892, 893-95 (Mich. Ct App. 1980) (holding that 
a topological survey—consisting of soil borings, percolation tests, and other tests 
to determine elevation—was not visible, on-site activity sufficient to constitute 
commencement of construction); E.W. Allen, 776 F.Supp. at 1509 (clearing, 
grading, filling land, placing stakes to define streets, drilling test holes, general 
excavation, cutting brush, and erecting a protective fence do not constitute 
commencement of construction); Clark v. General Elec. Co., 420 S.W.2d 830, 
833-34 (Ark. 1967) (using a bulldozer to remove foundations of old buildings and 
level the soil was not visible commencement of construction but "at most a 
preparatory operation.'5) 
On the other hand, the following activities typically do constitute visible 
commencement: excavation for the foundation, laying a foundation, sufficient 
work to demonstrate a commitment to undertaking a project through to completion. 
E. W. Allen at 1510. The distinction between the two categories is readily apparent. 
Work that evidences a project is going forward and that construction on a building 
or improvement is underway qualifies as visible commencement of work. In 
contrast, preliminary work that may or may not actually lead to a building or 
improvement does not. 
Nevertheless, EDSA argues that any activities that are "related" in some way 
to eventual construction or that can be seen by a passerby, satisfy the visible 
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commencement of work standard. This argument, which appears to based on a 
statement in Ketchum that " staking, which was the only visible manifestations of 
the surveyor's work, was not 'sufficiently noticeable or related to actual 
construction to impart notice to a prudent lender'" is simply wrong. 784 P.2d at 
1227. EDSA's interpretation of this statement would undo the Utah case law 
requiring the visible commencement of work. Under EDSA's definition of 
"related to construction," everything is related to construction no matter how 
indirect, no matter how far removed from actual on-site construction activities, and 
no matter whether construction actually even occurs. EDS A conveniently ignores 
the requirement that the work must be related to "actual construction" rather than 
to planned construction that may or may not occur in the future. Moreover, the 
courts' emphasis on actual on-site work is consistent with the interest in facilitating 
the construction financing industry by affording lenders some level of confidence 
in determining their priority status. If the work is readily apparent and of a 
character that is readily identifiable as actual beginning of construction of an 
improvement, there will be no doubt that liens may have attached. Otherwise, a 
reasonably prudent lender will have no rational basis for making this 
determination. 
Similarly, this Court should reject EDSA's argument that there was visible 
commencement of work because some tool used for the preparatory activities was 
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"visible/' e.g., the survey stakes or pin flags. EDSA misses the point. There must 
be something about the work itself that would tell a reasonable observer or prudent 
lender that construction of the building or improvement was beginning. It is not 
enough for such person to see a survey flag and conclude that a survey is being 
performed. If this were all that were required, surveys alone would almost always 
constitute visible commencement of work. This is contrary to this Court's holding 
in Ketchum and Klibanoffmd should be rejected. 
E. The Preparatory Activities Were Not Directly Related to Construction, 
Finally, even assuming that "work preparatory to construction can be 
sufficient to satisfy the 'visible commencement of work' standard," EDSA 
overstates the relationship between the activities on the Property prior to June 15, 
2001 and the construction of the Project. (EDSA Brief at 19-20.) Staking the 
roads and comers of buildings may be "directly related" to imminent 
commencement of construction and, consequently, may constitute visible 
commence of work under the Statute. See Klibanoff at f 30 (If survey stakes 
delineated not only the property boundaries but also the comers of all the buildings 
to be constructed, the stakes "went beyond mere surveying, and actually prepared 
the land for construction."). Staking the comers of the Property pursuant to a 
boundary survey as part of Red Sea's due diligence prior to purchasing the 
Property, is not. Similarly, installing pipe as part of the water and sewer system 
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that will service a residential subdivision is "directly related" to the construction of 
the subdivision. See First Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521, 526 
(Utah 1979). Replacing an old leaky pipe in an existing irrigation ditch, is not. 
Accordingly, the trial court's ruling that there was no visible commencement of 
work prior to June 15, 2001 is not clearly erroneous. 
F. The Preparatory Activities Did Not Take More Than a Few Days and 
Occurred Over Several Months, 
The trial court also found a reasonable observer would not be on notice 
because work crews only appeared on the Property sporadically and never 
exceeded three people. (R. 2874.) The work performed did not take more than a 
few days at a time and occurred over several months. (Id) Test holes and water 
monitoring wells were dug, but then backfilled. Livestock, including three or four 
horses and six or seven sheep, remained on the property through the spring of 
2001, and frequently knocked over the pin-flags.6 (Id) Rather than marshal the 
evidence in support of this finding, EDS A argues that it is "not sustainable on this 
Record" because the "torn-out pipe" from the irrigation ditch was left on the 
EDS A asserts that trial court's reliance on the photographs taken by Chiniquy and 
Donaldson "was clear error" because "[njone of the pictures relied on by the district court 
were taken during the relevant time and none of them show the monitoring wells " 
(EDSA Brief at 38). Both Chiniquy and Donaldson testified at trial and both of them 
testified that the photographs were fair and accurate representations of the condition of 
Property at the time they took them, i.e., March/April 2001 and August 2001. (R. 2881.) 
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Property and the pin flags, rebar and survey stakes were "continuously visible."7 
(EDSA Brief at 35-36.) 
As a preliminary matter, this Court did not hold that the trial court must 
consider the "totality of circumstances" or that in doing so, the trial court should 
consider all of the activities that occurred on the Property together as if the stakes 
and pin flags left behind remained fully in tact and visible to a reasonable observer 
months later. In fact, this Court's decision in Klibanoff'does not use the phrase 
"totality of the circumstances" or suggest that the trial court should disregard the 
fact that the activities took place over an eight month period. Moreover, although 
the fact that activities may occur over a period of time does not negate a conclusion 
that there is visible commencement of work, a lengthy time period such as is 
involved in this case, where the activities at issue took a total of six days over an 
eighth month period, is relevant to the question of whether the markings on the 
Property would survive and be visible so as to sufficiently put a reasonable 
observer exercising reasonable diligence on notice that there was visible 
commencement of work. See Clark, 420 S.W.2d at 833 (holding that using 
bulldozer and then removing it after a week, among other preparatory activities, 
was not sufficiently visible to constitute commencement of construction). 
7
 EDSA also asserts that people were "continuously on the Property prior to June 
15, 2001." (EDSA Brief at 29.) EDSA, however, ignores the fact that Chiniquy lived on 
the Property during this time period. Consequently, his daily presence on the Property 
would not put a reasonable observer on notice that lienable work was underway. 
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The long time period also creates the problem that the lender would 
essentially be required to inspect the property frequently, if not daily. Such a 
requirement would seriously impact local lending practices.8 Additionally, a 
conclusion that a party may rely on past activities and past visible markings on the 
property creates confusion and contradicts one of the purposes of the visible 
commencement test, which is to establish a date certain to which all mechanics' 
liens relate back. Accordingly, the trial court's finding, which was based on the 
totality of the circumstances, that the activities that took place on the Property over 
an eight-month prior to June 15, 2001 did not put a reasonable observer on notice 
that lienable work was underway was not clearly erroneous. 
G. The Replacement of the Old Pipe Constitutes Ordinary Maintenance. 
Ordinary and necessary maintenance and mere repairs do not constitute 
commencement of work under the Statute. Colder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 
922, 924-25 (Utah 1982); Klibanoff, 2005 UT App 367, \ 24. The trial court found 
that the "irrigation improvements that EDSA performed on the Property -
replacing a clogged and leaking pipe and clearing check dams - were not visible 
commencement of work, but ordinary maintenance of an existing irrigation 
8
 Indeed, if the Court accepts EDSA's argument, a reasonably prudent lender would 
be charged with knowledge of activities that occurred prior to a developer even applying 
for a loan. In this case, EDSA is asking the court to consider activities that took place in 
October and December of 2000, over eight months prior to the closing of the loan with 
Zions Bank. 
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system.5' (R. 2874.) The trial court found that the "old pipe was replaced and 
buried in one day with only the east end visible." (Id) EDS A, however, argues 
that these "drainage improvements were directly related to construction [because] 
the Property had a surface water problem [that[ directly affected Red Sea's ability 
to build the proposed development on the Property." (EDSA Brief at 22). This 
argument is contrary to the evidence presented at trial. Although EDSA asserts 
that this pipe "was a planned part of the development and was necessary to its 
progress and success/' EDSA failed to submit into evidence any plans or drawings 
that showed this pipe as part of the Project. Moreover, the replacement of the old 
pipe did not change the fundamental character of the Property or make the Property 
"habitable."9 Rather, the old pipe was broken and causing water to flow over the 
Property, creating an "artificial wetland" on the Property. (R. 2883.) Once fixed, 
the water no longer flowed over the Property. Given that the Property was farm 
land and horses and sheep continued to graze on the Property through the spring of 
2001, and that fixing broken irrigation pipes is a fact of life in Midway, the trial 
court's determination that this type of work on a existing irrigation system was not 
9
 The phrase "habitable" comes from Zundel, 600 P.2d at 524. The issue in Zundel was 
whether the installation of water and sewer lines within the subdivision triggered priority. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that it did because such water and sewer lines were 
"necessary to make residences to be built on such property habitable." The pipe installed 
by Chiniquy was not part of the water or sewer lines for the Project. The situation in 
Zundel is not remotely similar to the situation in this case. 
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sufficient to put a reasonable observer on notice that lienable work was underway 
is amply supported by the evidence. (Id.) 
IL THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT NO MATERIALS WERE ON 
THE PROPERTY PRIOR TO JUNE 15, 2001 IS NOT AGAINST THE 
CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The trial court found that there "were no building or construction materials, 
or any other materials that were intended to be incorporated into the Project on the 
Property prior to June 15, 2001." (R. 2881.) As stated above, EDSA has failed to 
marshal the evidence in support of this finding. Regardless, this finding is not 
against the clear weight of the evidence. EDSA admits that the only "material" on 
the Property at any time prior to June 15, 2001 was the new 15 inch pipe that 
replaced the old leaky pipe in the irrigation ditch. (EDSA Brief at 37.) This new 
pipe, which was only 40 feet in length, was reburied so that only the "mouth" of 
the pipe was visible. (R. 2883.) As stated above, EDSA failed to submit into 
evidence any plans or drawings that showed this pipe as part of the Project. The 
replacement of the old pipe did not change the fundamental character of the 
Property or make the Property "habitable." Nor was it "essential to the 
comfortable and convenient use of dwellings [such] that it would be 'turning back 
the clock to another century'" if the irrigation pipe had not been replaced. See 
Zundel at 525 (sewer and water lines are necessary to make property "habitable"). 
Similarly, there is no evidence that the rebar and PVC pipe were furnished for any 
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structure or improvement. The PVC pipes were not intended to be permanent 
ground water monitors and, in fact, were replaced after June 15, 2001. (R.2886.) 
The rebar stakes were placed in the ground because the horse and sheep on the 
Property kept knocking over and eating the pin flags. Once the delineation of the 
wetlands was approved, the pin flags and rebar could have been removed. Finally, 
two disinterested witnesses - Mr. Yahne and Mr. Donaldson - testified that they 
did not see any construction materials when they visited the Property in July 2001. 
(R. 3179 at 599-600, 607; R. 3181 at 773, 781-82.) Accordingly, the trial court's 
finding that there were no building or construction materials "furnished" on the 
Property for a "structure or improvement" is not clearly erroneous. 
As set forth above, the trial court's finding that there was no visible 
commencement of work or furnishing of materials is not against the clear weight of 
the evidence and, based on this evidence, it is simply not possible for this Court to 
"reach a firm conviction that a mistake has been made." See N.D. v. A.B., 2003 UT 
App 215,1f 12, 73 P.2d 971. This Court should affirm the Final Judgment. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE PURPORTED 
ASSIGNMENT OF THE CONTRACTS TO EDSA WAS INVALID AND 
THAT THE MECHANIC'S LIEN WAS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH 
RESPECT TO J.M. WILLIAMS' INTERESTS IN THE PROPERTY. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the purported assignment of the Contracts 
pursuant to a letter dated January 3, 2003 was not effective. (R. 2877.) The trial 
court first ruled that the assignment failed for lack of consideration because EDSA 
998906 1 29 
received no benefit from, and J.M. Williams did not receive any consideration for, 
the purported assignment. (R. 2878.) Second, the assignment failed because Red 
Sea never approved the assignment in writing as required by the Contracts. (R. 
2877.) Consequently, the trial court ruled that at the time EDSA recorded the 
Mechanic's Lien on November 8, 2002, which was two months before the 
assignment letter, "EDSA did not hold an assignment of contract rights, lien rights, 
or of any amounts owed by Red Sea to J.M. Williams." (Id.) The trial court also 
held that even if the assignment was effective, the Mechanic's Lien was not timely 
filed as to J.M. Williams' interests because it was not filed within 90 days of final 
completion of the Contracts, which the trial court found occurred on September 10, 
2001 and November 13, 2001 respectively. (Id) The trial court further found that 
"the incidental services later provided by J.M. Williams did not extend final 
completion of the contracts [but even] if this were not the case, the last date J.M. 
Williams provided services on the Project was March 29, 2002. (Id.) 
A. The Assignment Was Barred by the Non-Assignment Provisions. 
EDSA argues that the trial court incorrectly held that "J.M. Williams was 
prohibited from assigning its 'contract and interest' to EDSA" because a "clause 
prohibiting the assignment of a contract does not also prevent the assignment of a 
cause of action for a breach of contract." (EDSA Brief at 39). EDSA also cites to 
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§ 38-1-26 of the Statute, which provides that "[a] 11 liens under this chapter shall be 
assignable as other choses in action." (Id.) 
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling. In SME Ind. v. Thompson, 
the Utah Supreme Court noted the "general rule" that "a contract provision 
prohibiting the assignment of the contract itself, or of the rights and privileges 
under the contract, does not, unless a different intention is manifested, prohibit the 
assignment of a claim for damages on account of breach of contract." 2001 UT 54, 
t i l , 28 P.3d 669, 674. However, the Court also held that "where a contract 
expressly states that the right to sue for breach of contract is non-assignable, full 
force and effect must be given to such provision." Id. at 112. The Court reversed 
a grant of summary judgment because the non-assignment provision prohibited the 
assignment of "any interest" in the contract. The Court held that such phrase was 
ambiguous, and could include a prohibition against assignment of a breach of 
contract claim, and that the trial court was required to determine the intent of the 
parties, which was a question of fact. Id. 114. 
As in SME, the Contracts prohibit the assignment of any "interest in this 
Agreement without the written consent of the other [party]." (EDSA Brief at 
Addendum H.) Thus, the trial court finding that the purported assignment of the 
Contracts was barred is not clearly erroneous given the use of the term "interest" in 
the non-assignment provisions. (R. 2877-78.) Further, EDSA failed to offer any 
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evidence of the parties' intent with respect to the non-assignment provisions. (R. 
3177 at 44-81.) To the contrary, Mr. Williams testified that he did not obtain Red 
Sea's consent to the assignment because he did not "feel [he was] still obligated 
under the assignment provision of the contract." (R. 3177 at 74.) Moreover, the 
letter dated January 6, 2003 does not state that J.M. Williams is assigning its 
breach of contract action to EDSA. It simply states that J.M. Williams is assigning 
"the contract and interest for J.M. Williams & Associates, Incorporated, to 
EDSA/Cloward for The Homestead Lodge project located in Midway, Utah." 
(EDSA Brief at Addendum K.) The Court should affirm the trial court's ruling. 
B. The Assignment Was Not Supported by Adequate Consideration. 
The trial court found that the purported assignment failed for lack of 
consideration because EDSA "received no benefit from the purported assignment." 
(R. 2878.) Indeed, J.M. Williams testified that he "intended for EDSA to collect 
money from Red Sea, to pay EDSA's attorneys' fees, and to then pay the balance 
of anything collected to J.M. Williams." (Id.) The trial court also found that 
EDSA's agreement to "pay all legal fees and court costs" was not adequate 
consideration because the parties intended that J.M. Williams would reimburse 
EDSA for such fees and costs from the amounts collected from Red Sea. (Id.) 
EDSA fails to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings 
regarding the meaning of the non-assignment provision of the Contracts. 
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EDSA argues that the trial court erred because its agreement to pay all legal 
fees and court costs was adequate consideration. (EDSA Brief at 40.) This Court 
should affirm. For a promise to be legally enforceable, it must be supported by 
consideration. Manwill v. Oyler, 361 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1961). "When there 
exists only the fa9ade of a promise, i.e., a statement made in such vague or 
conditional terms that the person making it commits himself to nothing, the alleged 
'promise' is said to be 'illusory.'" Resource Management Co, v, Weston Ranch & 
Livestock Co, Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). "The mere fact that one man 
promises something to another creates no legal duty and makes no legal remedy 
available in case of non-performance." Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 
628, 632 (Utah App. 1988). Indeed, there is no evidence that EDSA was legally 
obligated to pursue any recovery under the Contracts. See Hirschhorn v. Nelden-
Judson Drug Co,, 72 P. 386, 388 (Utah 1903); Resource Management, supra, at 
1038 ("[W]here the promissory retains an unlimited right to decide the nature or 
extent of his performance, the promise is illusory and too indefinite for legal 
enforcement.") 
In this case, EDSA retained an unlimited right to decide the nature or extent 
of its performance. As Mr. Williams testified at trial, it was "my understanding 
that out of that money [EDSA] would be pay attorneys' fees or a portion of the 
attorneys' fees. And then I'm basing it on our past experience that I would have 
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hopes of being paid, but there's no guarantee in writing that it would be." (R. 3177 
at 65.) When asked whether J.M. Williams made any promises to EDS A in 
connection with the purported assignment, Mr. Williams stated "Not specifically . . 
. We continue to work with them on several projects and so it's just good practice 
to help each other out. But no, nothing specifically directly tied to it that I'm 
aware of." (Id. at 66.) From the this evidence, the trial court correctly ruled that 
the purported assignment was ineffective for lack of consideration. 
C. The Mechanic's Lien Was Ineffective With Respect to J.M, Williams1 
Interest Because It Did Not Comply with § 38-1-7 of the Statute. 
The trial court properly determined that the Mechanic's Lien was ineffective 
as to J.M. Williams' interest because it did not substantially comply with § 38-1-7 
of the Statute. (R. 2876.) J.M. Williams did not record a mechanic's lien for any 
of its services under the Contracts. (R.2878.) The Mechanic's Lien, which was 
recorded by EDSA before the purported assignment, does not include any of the 
information for the services performed by J.M. Williams on the Project as required 
by § 38-1-7 of the Statute. (See Mechanic's Lien attached hereto as Addendum B.) 
Specifically, the Mechanic's Lien does not state the time when the first and last 
labor or service was performed by J.M. Williams, the name, current address and 
phone number of J.M. Williams, or the signature of J.M. Williams. (R. 2876.) 
EDSA's argument that it "could file a lien notice and pursue J.M. Williams' 
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assigned lien claim in its own name" without complying with these requirements is 
unavailing. (EDS A Brief at 40.) 
"Mechanic's liens are purely statutory, and lien claimants may only acquire 
a lien by complying with the statutory provisions authorizing them." Utah Sav. & 
Loan Assoc, v, Mecham, 366 P.2d 589, 600 (Utah 1961). Although "substantial 
compliance" is all that is required, in this case, there was no compliance. For 
example, the signature of J.M. Williams is not "a hypertechnicality" that this Court 
can ignore. Verification by the lien claimant is necessary so that "[fjrivolous, 
unfounded, and inflated claims can thereby be minimized, and the prejudgment 
property rights of the [property owners] receive their due protection." First Sec, 
Mtg. Co, v, Hansen, 631 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1981). Moreover, the purpose of 
descriptive terms in a lien notice is to adequately inform interested parties of the 
existence and scope of the lien. Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & 
Loan Co,, 798 P.2d 738, 747 (Utah 1990). These requirements are mandatory 
conditions precedence to the very creation and existence of a lien. Graff v. Boise 
Cascade Corp,, 660 P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1983). 
With respect to J.M. Williams' interests, EDSA's Mechanic's Lien fails to 
meet not just one, but at least three separate requirements. (R. 2876.) Moreover, 
there is nothing in the Mechanic's Lien that would have adequately informed 
anyone of the existence of a lien for services performed by J.M. Williams. 
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Although a lien claimant may aggregate work performed under separate contracts 
into a single lien claim, this presupposes that the lien claimant is the party to such 
separate contracts. See Projects Unlimited, supra, at 749. Similarly, although 
§ 38-1-26 of the Statute allows an assignee of a lien "to commence and prosecute 
actions thereon in his own name in the manner provided herein," this does not 
eviscerate the obligation of a lien claimant to file a lien that complies with the 
requirements of § 38-1-7. The trial court's ruling was correct. 
D. The Trial Court's Finding that the Mechanic's Lien Was Untimely 
with Respect to J.M. Williams' Interests Was Not Clearly Erroneous. 
Utah courts have articulated a two-prong test for determining whether a 
mechanic's lien has been timely filed after completion of an original contract. 
"Completion" occurs "when (1) the work under the contract 'has been 
"substantially completed," leaving only minor or trivial work to be accomplished,5 
and (2) the work 'has been accepted by the owner."5 Ellsworth Paulsen 
Construction Co, v. 51-SPR, LLC, 2006 UT App 353,120; 144 P.3d. 261, 268. 
Under the February Contract, J.M. Williams was hired to provide all the 
construction documents. (R. 3177 at 48.) As consideration for these services, Red 
Sea agreed to pay J.M. Williams an estimated lump sum fee of $104,640.00. (R. 
2888.) The cover letter that accompanied the February Contract reiterates that the 
fee does not include "site visits and any construction administration.55 (Id.) Under 
the October Contract, J.M. Williams agreed to perform engineering services for 
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pre-cast concrete instead of "cast-in-place." (Id.) Mr. Williams testified that he 
did not perform any services after October 10, 2001. (R. 3177 at 70.) 
The trial court found that J.M. Williams completed its services as required 
by the February Contract prior to September 10, 2001. (R. 2880.) The trial court 
further found that J.M. Williams completed its services as required by the October 
Contract prior to November 13, 2001. (Id.) Thereafter, the only amounts J.M. 
Williams invoiced Red Sea for work of any kind was for $250.00 for a pressure 
reducing box on October 10, 2001 and printing costs for extra sets of plans on 
March 29, 2002. (Id.) The trial court further found that Red Sea accepted the 
services of J.M. Williams without complaint. (Id.) The Mechanic's Lien, 
however, was not filed until November 8, 2002. (R. 2877.) Accordingly, the trial 
court concluded that the Mechanic's Lien with respect to J.M. Williams' interests 
was untimely and EDSA's action to foreclose a mechanic's lien for work 
performed by J.M. Williams is barred because § 38-1-7 (l)(a) of the Statute is 
jurisdictional. (R. 2877.) See AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 
714 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1986); Diehl Lumber Transp. Inc. v. Mickelson, 802 P.2d 
739, 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Despite these findings, EDS A argues that the 
Mechanic's Lien was timely because J.M. Williams and Red Sea testified at trial 
that "they contemplated that J.M. Williams would perform work, including site 
visits and inspections as noted in the cover letter to the February Contract [ ], 
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during the construction phase, and that as a result, the Contract has not yet been 
finally completed as of November 8, 2002." (EDSA Brief at 41.) 
The question of whether there has been final completion for purposes of 
determining whether a mechanic's lien has been timely filed is "fact sensitive" and 
generally "for the trier of fact to determine." Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Co., 
supra, at \ 20. Once again, EDSA fails to marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings. See, e.g., R. 2888-89; 3177 at 48, 49, 71-73, 76. 
The trial court's finding that final completion of the Contracts occurred by 
September 10, 2001 and November 13, 2001 respectively was not clearly 
erroneous. Indeed, the undisputed evidence demonstrated that as of these dates, all 
of the work that J.M. Willaims was hired to perform had been completed and 
accepted by Red Sea as the owner of the Property. See R.A. McKell Excavating, 
Inc. v Wells Fargo Bank, 2004 UT 48, f 10;11 Roberts v. Hansen, 479 P.2d 345, 
347 (Utah 1971); Covert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 172 
In R.A. McKell, the general contractor hired McKell to perform excavation, 
grading, surface, and subsurface improvements on a proposed residential subdivision. 
The total contract price was $204,000 and the scope of the project consisted of sewer 
line, water line, storm drain, sidewalk, and site work. When the contractor was slow to 
make payments, McKell suspended operations. At the time of suspension, McKell had 
performed only $29,000 of work under the contract. Id. at % 2. Given these facts, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that it was undisputed that McKell had not yet completed the 
full scope of work contracted for. Id. at <f 12. 
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(Utah App. 1990). The trial court properly declined to extend final completion to 
some indefinite time in the future when Red Sea may or may not have entered into 
another agreement with J.M. Williams for construction administration services. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
TO KLIBANOFF WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Whether attorneys' fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Crowley v. Black, 2007 UT App 245, ^ 6. In contrast, 
"[w]hich party is the prevailing party is an appropriate question for the trial court." 
Id. Therefore, the trial court's determination as to who was the prevailing party is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. R.T. Nelson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 
11, f 25, 40 P.3d 1119; Cache County v. Bern, 2005 UT App 204, f 7, 128 P.3d 63 
(citing A.K.&R Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73, ^ 7, 47 
P.2d 92 and Chang v. Soldier Summit Dev., 2003 UT App 415, f 20, 82 P.3d 203). 
Similarly, the trial court has "'broad discretion in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable fee, and [the Court] will consider that determination against an abuse-
of-discretion standard."' Myrah v. Campbell, 2007 UT App 168, f 31, 578 Utah 
Adv. Rep 5; Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988). EDS A 
EDS A does not challenge the trial court's finding that the services performed by 
J.M. Williams after November 13, 2001, i.e., the pressure reducing box and printing of 
extra copies of plans, did not toll the lien filing period. Regardless, these services were 
completed by March 2002 at the latest. 
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concedes that attorneys' fees are recoverable in this action pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-18 (1). (EDSA Brief at 43.) 
A, Klibanoff Was the Prevailing Party. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Klibanoff was 
the "successful party" entitled to attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 
(1). (R. 2872.) As a preliminary matter, EDSA has failed to marshal the evidence 
in support of the trial court's finding. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 
317 (Utah 1998) (Appellant challenging award of attorneys' fees is required to 
marshal the evidence in support of the award and then show that the evidence is 
legally insufficient). Regardless, there is no question that Klibanoff is the 
"successful party" under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1), which provides that "in 
any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall 
be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee to be fixed by the court." 
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, EDSA optimistically argues that the case is "a 
draw and attorneys' fees should not be awarded to Klibanoff." (EDSA Brief at 
44.) There can be only one prevailing party in any litigation. Chang, 2003 UT 
App. 415, f^ 27. In a mechanic's lien action, the successful party is "one who 
successfully enforces or defends against a lien action." Kurth v. Wiarda, 1999 UT 
App 335, f 9 , 991 P.2d 1113. 
13
 Utah courts have routinely used the terms "successful party" and "prevailing party" 
interchangeably. Whipple at f 19. 
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EDS A did not prevail on any aspect of its mechanic's lien foreclosure 
action. (R. 2872-73.) Consequently, EDSA's reliance on Whipple, supra, is 
misplaced. (EDSA Brief at 43.) In Whipple, the plaintiff filed a mechanic's lien 
foreclosure action seeking $30,000 and the defendant counterclaimed for $25,000 
for defective work. Whipple at [^ 2 . After calculating the parties' respective wins 
and losses, the trial court awarded the plaintiff a net judgment of only $527. Id. 
Applying the flexible and reasoned approach in determining the successful party, 
the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly determined the case was 
a "draw" and that neither party was entitled to recover attorneys' fees. Id. at % 30. 
The rationale articulated in Whipple for denying or reducing attorneys' fees 
has no application to this case. EDS A sought to establish that the Mechanic's Lien 
had priority over the Trust Deed and to foreclose the Mechanic's Lien or recover in 
excess of $800,000 under the Bond. (R. 1360-71.) The Final Judgment dismisses 
EDSA's foreclosure action with prejudice and on the merits, dismisses EDSA's 
declaratory relief action with prejudice and on the merits, releases the Bond, quiets 
title in the Property in Klibanoff s successor-in-interest, and awards Klibanoff his 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. (R. 3133-35.) Neither the fact that EDSA 
obtained a default judgment against a bankrupt Red Sea at the outset of this case, 
998906.1 41 
nor the fact that other lien claimants waived their claims early in the case, 
transforms EDS A into the "successful party" as between EDS A and Klibanoff.14 
B, Klibanoff Is Entitled to Recover His Attorneys' Fees Incurred in AH 
"Phases" of this Action. 
EDS A next argues that this Court should only allow reasonable attorneys' 
fees related to the trial. (EDSA Brief at 44). EDSA argues that Klibanoff should 
not be awarded attorneys' fees for the "discovery and summary judgment phase" 
and "first appeal phase" because the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Klibanoff was reversed on appeal Id. EDSA's argument ignores the fact 
that Klibanoff won and EDSA lost their respective motions for summary judgment. 
(R. 1396-1406.) This argument also ignores the fact that, on appeal, this Court 
upheld the trial court's ruling that "record notice" did not trigger priority under the 
Statute.15 (R. 1992-98.) Importantly, this Court's reversal of the trial court's 
determination that there was no visible commencement of work as a matter of law 
was based on facts offered by EDSA at summary judgment which this Court was 
obligated to accept as true. {Id.) EDSA, however, was unable to prove these facts 
14
 EDSA claims that it obtained "judgment" on both its breach of contract claim and its 
unjust enrichment claim. This is inaccurate. An unjust enrichment claim is an alternative claim 
to a breach of contract claim and, therefore, EDSA's default judgment was for either the breach 
of contract claim or the unjust enrichment claim. 
15
 EDSA argued in the first appeal that record notice of the Jack Johnson lien, which was 
recorded three days before the Trust Deed, established priority over the Trust Deed. Klibanoff, 
supra, at U 12 (R. 1992-98.) This Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that record notice does 
not establish priority and that "in order to perfect a [mechanic's] lien and create priority as to 
other third parties, the lienor must record and commence visible work." Id. at ^  16 and 17. 
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at trial (R. 2871-94.) The term "prevailing party" is defined as a "party in whose 
favor a judgment is rendered." Cache County, 2005 UT App 204, f 14 (emphasis 
added). Therefore, a party is not a prevailing party until after a determination on 
the merits is made by either a jury or a trial court judge. Id. This Court should not 
limit Klibanoff s attorneys' fees to those incurred after September 1, 2005. 
C. The Parsons Behle & Latimer Affidavit Complied with Rule 73 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In support of his application, Klibanoff submitted an Affidavit of Attorneys' 
Fees and Memorandum of Costs ("PB&L Affidavit") and an Amended Attorneys' 
Fee Affidavit of Stephen Quesenberry ("HJ&S Affidavit").16 (R. 2895-2928; 
2963-3003.) The PB&L Affidavit attached a redacted computer report which 
provided a detailed record of the legal work actually performed, including the 
number of hours spent by each attorney, paralegal, and project assistant for each 
task performed. (R. 2904-19.) The PB&L Affidavit described in detail the reasons 
why the work was reasonably necessary to prosecute this action. (R.2922-28.) 
The PB&L Affidavit affirmed that the hourly billing rates for the attorneys 
performing work on this matter were consistent with the hourly billing rates 
customarily charged in Wasatch County and Salt Lake County for these legal 
services. (Id.) Finally, the PB&L Affidavit sets forth the circumstances that 
16
 Stephen Quesenberry of Hill, Johnson & Schmutz represented Klibanoff from the 
inception of this case through October 2003. Parsons Behle & Latimer filed an Entry of 
Appearance of Counsel on October 13, 2003. (R. 751-53.) 
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existed which required the consideration of additional factors, including those 
listed in the Rules of Professional Conduct. (Id.) 
Nevertheless, EDSA argues that the PB&L Affidavit does not "strictly 
comply" with Rule 73(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because it "does not 
set forth the hourly rate of each of the various attorneys, paralegals, and 'project 
assistants' working on the case." (EDSA Brief at 46.) This argument attempts to 
elevate form over substance. The report attached to the PB&L Affidavit sets forth 
the time spent by each biller on a daily basis and the amount charged for each 
separate time entry, allowing for an easy calculation of the hourly rate for each 
biller. (R. 2904-19.) This Court should reject EDSA's argument. See R.T.Nelson 
Co., supra, 2002 UT 11, f 21 (Even if affidavit was not "ideal" presentation of 
information, it was still sufficient to support an award of attorneys' fees). 
D, The Attorneys' Fees Awarded to Klibanoff Were Reasonable. 
After considering the Affidavits and applying the factors set forth in Dixie 
State Bank, the trial court issued its Ruling and made the following findings: (a) 
the case involved a mechanic's lien for $800,000; (b) the case presented unique 
and complex issues of fact and law; (c) mounting an aggressive and thorough 
defense by seasoned litigators was clearly justified; (d) the fee affidavits set forth 
in reasonable detail the legal work actually performed; (e) that work was 
reasonably necessary to defend this action; and (f) the hourly billing rates for the 
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attorneys performing the work are consistent with the hourly rates billed in Utah by 
attorneys of similar experience for similar legal work. (R. 3220-22.) Accordingly, 
the trial court awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $217,753.95. (Id) 
Despite these findings, EDSA argues that the attorneys' fee award is "per se 
unreasonable" and should be overturned by the Court. (EDSA Brief at 48). Once 
again, EDSA fails to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's award and 
then show that evidence to be legally insufficient. See Valcarce, supra, 961 P.2d 
at 317. Moreover, even if the trial court's Ruling did not specifically reference all 
such evidence, EDSA was nevertheless required to present "every scrap of 
competent evidence" which supports the trial court's attorneys' fees calculation. 
See United Park, supra, 2006 UT 35, ffi[ 39 and 40.17 
In its brief, EDSA correctly cites to the four factors for determining a 
reasonable attorneys' fee set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. (EDSA Brief at 
47). The first factor involves a determination as to what legal work was actually 
performed. Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990. EDSA does not dispute that the 
work set forth in the PB&L Affidavit was the work that was actually done on 
behalf of Klibanoff. The second factor is how much of the work performed was 
reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter. Id. With one exception, 
17 
In contrast to Klibanoff, who submitted substantial evidence to support his request for 
attorneys' fees, the plaintiff in Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 750 (Utah 
1982), failed to present any evidence in support of its request for attorneys' fees. 
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EDSA does not identify a single work effort as not being reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute the matter or as not being conducted in a reasonably efficient 
manner. EDSA challenges 36 hours spent by Scott Bell during several weeks after 
the trial researching issues for Klibanoffs post trial brief. (EDSA Brief at 49.) 
The time records, attached as Exhibit A to the PB&L Affidavit, show that the 
issues researched were those raised at trial and during closing statements relating 
to the level of knowledge imputed to the reasonable observer, the presumed 
physical vantage point of the reasonable observer, and the effect of observations 
made many months before the relevant recording date. (R. 2904-06.) Because a 
ruling by the trial court could have changed Utah law relating to the standard for 
the visible commencement of construction and also the construction financing and 
building industries in Utah, and because the trial court inquired into the existence 
of law on these issues during closing argument, Mr. Bell's research was extensive, 
covering not only Utah but all jurisdictions which have addressed the issues. 
Other this criticism, EDSA does not provide this Court with any specific 
basis for its claim that Klibanoffs fees are unreasonable. EDSA's observation that 
the trial was a 2 lA day bench trial is not a sufficient basis alone to conclude that 
the fees are per se unreasonable. This is especially true in view of the fact that the 
Exhibit A shows that Mr. Bell's time also included work to assist with the drafting 
and revising of the post trial brief 
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bulk of the discovery in the case had not been done until after the appeal Other 
than EDSA's principal and the developer, none of the geotechnical witnesses, the 
wetlands environmental witnesses, the appraisers, the property manager, or the 
neighbor who testified at trial had been interviewed or deposed during discovery 
nor had their documents been subpoenaed or reviewed. There were also numerous 
witnesses, some who were identified in the parties' disclosures and some who were 
not, who had relevant information and were located and interviewed but were not 
called at trial, including the landscape contractor, other neighbors, and colleagues 
and former employees of the geotechnical and wetlands environmental witnesses 
who did testify at trial (R. 3139-49.) 
Contrary to EDSA's assertion that the analysis of the legal and factual issues 
had already been performed during the earlier portion of the case, the legal and 
factual analysis of the case had to be revisited in view of the expanded 
understanding of the facts from the pretrial witness interviews and in view of the 
direction contained in this Court's opinion. (Id.) Additionally, not just one 
"narrow factual issue" was tried. The trial required preparation on all issues, 
including ones that had not previously been developed or briefed, such as whether 
the Mechanic's Lien was timely, whether Red Sea had abandoned the Project, the 
Parsons Behle & Latimer was not retained until September 2003, after discovery 
had already closed. 
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terms and enforceability of the Red Sea/EDSA agreement, and the terms and 
enforceability of J.M. Williams' purported assignment of the Contracts. (Id) 
As to EDSA's final challenge to the involvement of a two partner level 
lawyers, the involvement of lawyers with nine and nineteen years of litigation 
experience respectively is not unreasonable, especially in view of the fact that 
Klibanoff prevailed at trial. The development and preparation of the case after 
the appeal, the significance of the issues to Utah mechanics' lien law, and the 
number of witnesses and documents justify the manpower devoted to the case. 
This Court should affirm the Attorneys' Fee Order. 
E. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Refusing to 
Apportion the Attorneys1 Fee Award Among the Other Lien Claimants 
Who Recorded, But Did not Prosecute, Mechanic's Liens. 
EDS A asserts that even if the award is upheld, this Court should apportion it 
with three other lien claimants named as defendants in this action: the Jack 
Johnson Company, R/C Engineering, Inc., and Ray Quinney & Nebeker. (EDSA 
Brief at 50.) Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1), however, contains no such authority. 
EDSA does not claim that the rates billed for Ms. Scott's and Ms. Whitney's services are 
not consistent with rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services. 
21
 EDSA also used two attorneys at trial: Mr. Armstrong and Ms. Tarkington. 
EDSA also argues that Klibanoff is judicially estopped from seeking a "higher amount" 
for the period of time between October 2003 and June 18, 2004 than he was awarded pursuant to 
the trial court's Order dated October 20, 2004. (EDSA Brief at 50) (R. 1863-1865.) This Court 
should reject this argument. As the trial court held in its Ruling entered September 11, 2006, 
when this Court reversed the grant of summary judgment, it also reversed the trial court's Order 
dated October 20, 2004. (R. 3130-32.) Consequently, Klibanoff was not judicially estopped 
from seeking all of the fees he incurred during that time period. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-17 relates to an award of costs to subcontractors, including 
the costs and attorneys' fees incurred to prepare and record their mechanic's liens, 
and is inapplicable here. Additionally, these defendants are no longer parties to the 
action and this Court lacks jurisdiction to enter such an order. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the Final Judgment and 
Attorneys' Fee Order. The Court should also award Klibanoff his attorneys' fees 
and costs incurred on appeal. 
DATED this of August, 2007. 
LAURA S. SCOTT 
ELIZABETH S. WHITNEY 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee 
Daniel Klibanoff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this of August, 2007,1 caused to be served, 
via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE DANIEL KLIBANOFF to: 
Richard J. Armstrong 
WOOD CRAPO, LLC 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
^Z^ 
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Tab A 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3. Those entitled to lien - What may be attached. 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished 
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or 
superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed 
labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or'concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or equipment 
for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or equipment 
furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of 
any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or otherwise except as 
the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the Residence Lien Restriction and 
Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to such interest as the owner 
may have in the property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5. Priority - Over other encumbrances. 
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of 
the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure 
or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other 
encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time when the 
building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first material 
furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of 
which the lien holder had no notice and which was unrecorded at the time the 
building, structure or improvement was commenced, work begun, or first material 
furnished on the ground. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1). Attorneys' Fees. 
Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action 
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled 
to recover a reasonable attorneys1 fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed 
as costs in the action. 
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TabB 
When Recorded Mail To: 
Kitimd J. Armstrong gnt 250643 Bk 05§7 Pg 0327-0329 
WOODCRAPO,LlX. ELIZABETH II PflLHIER,3Recordet 
^ F ^ S o a A T ^ m l e Suite 500 UASATCH C0UHTY CORPORATION 
60EastSou&Ta^le^tOOO
 a o o E ^ fl U2&tm Fee 14 .00 WMM 
Salt Lake City, l/iah 84145-0898 FOR ARHSTR0K8 RICfiftRD 
NOTICE OF MECHANICS LIEN 
Notice is hereby given that EDSACloward, LLC (hereinafter referred to as "Claimant"), 
located at 2696 North University Avenue, Suite 290, Provo, Utah 84604, and whose telephone 
number is (801) 375-1223, hereby claims a lien pursuant to Section 38-1-1 etseq. Utah Code 
Annotated upon the property described hereinafter. Claimant's lien is based upon the following; 
1. The Claimant provided labor, materials and/or equipment upon and in connection 
with the improvement of certain realty in Wasatch County, State of Utah, being more particularly 
described as follows: 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION; 
See attached Exhibit A 
2. To the best of Qaimant's knowledge, The Homestead Lodge, LC is the reputed or 
record owner of the property described above, 
3. The labor, materials and/or equipment fbr which demand and claim is made were 
provided to or at the request of Red Sea Development, Ken Forrest, and/or Tim Shields. 
4. The Claimant ftraished the first labor, materials and/or equipment on 
October 9,2000 and famished the last labor, materials and/or equipment on June 3,2002, 
5. If this Notice of Lien is being filed on a residence as defined in Utah Code 
Annotated § 38-11 -102(17), notice is hereby provided that under Utah law an "owner" may be 
protected against liens being maintained against an "owner-occupied residence" and from other 
civil action being maintained to recover monies owed for "qualified services" performed or 
provided by suppliers and subcontractors as apart of the contract between a real estate developer 
or an original contractor and the owner, if and only if the following conditions are satisfied: 
(1) the owner entered into a written contract with either a real estate developer or an original 
contractor; (2) the original contractor was properly licensed or exempt from licensure under 
Tide 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act at the time the contract was 
A V} 
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executed; and (3) the owner paid in full the original contractor or real estate developer or their 
successors or assigns in accordance with the written contract and any written or oral amendments 
to the contract. 
DATED this 8th day of November, 2002. 
Richard i. Arms 
Attorney and AuUj^ flz' 
EDSACloward, L.C 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 8* day of November, 2002, 
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EXHIBIT A 
A parcel of land located in the Northwest Quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Wasatch County, Utah containing tax identification numbers; 
OMI-0289-0, OMI-0270-1, OMI-0290-O, and more particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING at a fence corner on the east line of Homestead Road, said fence comer being North 
0r56'44" West 1056.97 feet along the section line and East 968,61 feet (North 1056.34 feel and East 
933.80 feet by record) from a Wasatch County brass cap marking the West Quarter Comer of 
Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence along 
said fence South 87o43'00" East 1,388,01 feet (South 87°43*00" East 1387.42 feet by record); thence 
South 13°40'00" West 50.61 feet (South lBWOO" West 47.00 feet by record) to a fence corner; 
thence North 86°30,00n West 60.00 feet; thence South 26°00'00" West 195,00 feet; thence South 
59°00W West 178.00 feet; thence North 87°25'00" West 101.00 feet; thence South23B15'00" West 
84.00 feet; thence South 87°43'00" East 58.67 feet; thence along the west line of Creek Place 
Subdivision and ifs extension South 07°04'28" West 304.25 feet to the centerline of 200 North 
Street; thence along said centerline South 89°3742" West 285.14 feet; thence North 00°06'35" East 
183.39 feet; thence North 89°53,25" West 118.77 feet to an existing fence as described in that 
property recorded in Book 149 at Page 177 of the Wasatch County records; thence along said fence 
North 00°06'35" East 137.75 feet (North 00°04'05M East by record) to the northeast comer of said 
property; thence along an existing fence and the north line of said property North 87°43'00" West 
575.77 feet; thence North 01 °30'00" East 150.00 feet; thence South Wl'dO" East 3.96 feet to said 
east line of Homestead Road; thence along said east line North 01 b30'00" East 252.50 feet to the 
POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Containing 594,506 square feet or 13.648 acres. 
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